Motivation and collusion among agents in the evasion of indirect taxes: an experimental approach

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Dynamic behaviours in tax evasion. An experimental approach

This paper investigates, from an experimental perspective, on the tax payers behaviour in a dynamic context and more precisely tries to cope with three main topics related to tax evasion. The first aspect analysed regards the effects produced by a repetitive dynamic choice process on the subjects’ attitude towards risk and on the ability to learn to cope with risk. The second theme treated is about the effects produced on the tax payers by the inclusion in the experimental design of psychological moral constraints. The final topic is on the effects produced by the specific experimental context chosen (the simulation of a fiscal environment compared with other simulated environments). The main results emerged from the 8 experiments carried out confirmed the importance of the psychological factors in determining the tax payers actual behaviours and shown the complex dynamic that the agents activate to cope with risk

The Condorcet paradox: an experimental approach to a voting process

This paper analyses the effects played by rules within a coordination game. The starting point is constituted by the wide field of Public Choice theories. More precisely the focus of the research is on the stability of the voting process. The experiment is build on a game played through computers and the experimental subjects must perform some choices that can led to different individual and collective solutions. The game that they play is based on a set of rules that must be voted by the players themselves before a new session of the experiment will be run. The idea is to verify the degree of stability of the collective choices (logrolling phenomena)

Influence of time delay on choice between gambles: Savoring the emotion

In two laboratory studies involving 285 undergraduate students presented with a one-shot real choice we observe a systematic influence of time delay on the preferences for two lotteries, equal in expected value, but different in the degree of probability and outcome. The more the outcome is postponed (2 weeks, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months), the more individuals prefer the lottery offering a higher value (400 Euro) but a lower probability (.02) compared to the one offering a lower value (14 Euro) but a higher probability (.60). We explain these findings assuming a savoring hypothesis according to which, for highly emotional events, individuals prefer to postpone the desirable outcome, enjoying the savoring experience of anticipating the future emotions. It also suggests that for decisions where uncertainty resolution is postponed in the future, people will underweight the probability and overweight the outcome.intertemporal choice, time delay, time horizon, gambles, risk